



My topic is how to make decisions when you possess foreknowledge of the conse-
quences of your choice. Many have thought that these kinds of decisions pose a dis-
tinctive and novel threat to causal decision theory.1 Lewis (1981) says that they are
“much more problematic for decision theory than the Newcomb problems”.2 Price
(2012) thinks that these decisions should push causalists towards a subjectivist theory
of causation. Hitchcock (2016) and Stern (forthcoming) have proposed amend-
ments to causal decision theory which only apply in cases of foreknowledge. And
Spencer (2020) denies the possibility of certain kinds of foreknowledge specifically in
order to rescue causal decision theory from cases he views as counterexamples.
My thesis is that causal decision theory does not face any new problems from de-
cisions involving foreknowledge. Some of the purported problem cases are not prob-
lems. Others are problems, but not problems for causal decision theory. They are
instead problems for our theories of subjunctive supposition. Other of the purported
problem cases are problems for causal decision theory, but they are not new problems
for causal decision theory. They are old problems transposed into a new key.
Nonetheless, reflection ondecisionsmadewith foreknowledge can teach and vividly
illustrate important lessons for causalists. In particular, there are four lessons causal-
ists should learn from, and bear in mind when considering, decisions made with fore-
knowledge. Firstly, our intuitive judgements about the instrumental value of our choices
can be misled when we have control over our rational credence that ϕ without having
control over whether ϕ. Secondly, we should distinguish the probability of an out-
come, were you to choose an option, from that chance of that outcome, conditional
on you choosing the option. Thirdly, our intuitive judgements about the instrumental
value of our choices can be misled when we don’t have control over our rational cre-
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1. English doesn’t distinguish between the situation you face when deciding between options, and the option
you end up selecting. It allows us to use ‘decision’ and ‘choice’ for both. To avoid confusion, I’ll adopt the
terminological convention of always using ‘decision’ for the situation you face, and ‘choice’ for the selection




dence that ϕ, but we do have control over whether ϕ. And fourthly, you should not
always take your foreknowledge for granted when deliberating about what to do.
Some of these lessons require the extravagance of foreknowledge to learn. Others
should be familiar from less exotic decisions involving reliable prediction. Nonethe-
less, decisions made with foreknowledge provide a particularly striking and evocative
illustration of the lessons. And all of the lessons are needed to navigate the unfamiliar
and confusing terrain faced by agents with foreknowledge. Once we’ve appreciated
these lessons, we are left with a version of causal decision theory which faces no novel
threats from foreknowledge.
2 | foreknowledge
Foreknowledge is not just knowledge of the future, nor knowledge of the future conse-
quences of your choice. Most knowledge like this is unremarkable. I know that it will
snow next winter in Toronto, that I’ll make mapo tofu for dinner tonight, and that I’ll
enjoy it. As I’ll use the term here, what makes your knowledge that ϕ foreknowledge
is that ϕ is at least partly about the future, and your belief that ϕ is caused by events
in the future which ϕ is about. In my view, rational choice is not a function of what
you know, but instead of what credences have been rationalised by your information.
So, more generally, if you have some information about ϕ, I will call this information
‘foreknowledge’ iff ϕ is at least partly about the future, and the information is caused
by the future events which ϕ is about. (Thus, as I use the term, some, but not all,
foreknowledge is knowledge.)
In the foregoing, I saidwhat it was for you to have foreknowledge. Even if you think
that foreknowledge like this is impossible, you needn’t deny that a rational agent could
be rational in taking seriously the possibility that they have foreknowledge. And my
interest is in how you should choose in circumstances like these. Throughout, then, I
will be focused on decisions in which it is a live epistemic possibility for you that you
have foreknowledge. Whether or not you really do have foreknowledge is irrelevant.
I’ll say that whatever foreknowledge youmay possess comes to you from the oracle.
This is a stipulative use of the term. ‘The oracle’ could be a time traveller, fortune teller,
crystal ball, angel, demon, or prophetic dream. You take the oracle’s knowledge of the
future to be like an ordinary knower’s knowledge of the past and present. Whereas
ordinary humans perceive and recall only what is or has been, she perceives and re-
calls what will be. Perhaps her eyes have receptors for tachyons instead of photons.
Perhaps she is a time traveller. Perhaps God whispers news from the future into her
ear. The mechanism is unimportant. What makes someone an oracle is just that: 1)
her prophesies are in general about events which have yet to unfold, events which lie
in the future of the prophesy; 2) her prophesies are, in general, caused by the events
they are about; and 3) in general, her prophesies are accurate. It doesn’t matter for my
purposes whether such an oracle really could exist (though, in fact, I think she could).
All that matters for my purposes is that it could be rational for you to take seriously
the possibility that she does.
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By the way, I’m going to take for granted that the future is not open in any inter-
esting or controversial sense of the term—and I’m going to take it for granted that you
also take this for granted. There are interesting asymmetries between past and future.3
But I’ll assume that facts about what will happen are just as metaphysically fixed, de-
terminate, and unchanging as facts about what has happened—and I’ll also assume
that you will assume this throughout any rational deliberation about how to choose. If
time branches or changes (over hypertime, perhaps), then it is less clear in what sense
you could have foreknowledge of your future. You may have knowledge of what may
be in your future, along one open branch, or what was in your future at some earlier
hypertime, but this needn’t be knowledge of whatmust be in your future on every open
branch, or what is in your future, at your current hypertime.
3 | causal decision theory
When you face a decision, you’ll have some collection of available acts, A, between
which you must choose. And there will be some collection of relevant ways things
might be—let’s call these ways things might be ‘worlds’, and denote their collection
with ‘W ’.4 I’ll suppose throughout that bothA andW are finite.5 I’ll also suppose that
you have a subjective probability, or credence, function, C, defined over every set of
worlds fromW . For every actA ∈ A, there will be a set of worlds in which you choose
A. I’ll refer to that set of worlds with ‘A’ (in italics). Then, your credence that you’ll
choose A is given by C(A). I will also assume that, for every world w ∈ W , there is a
degree to which you desire that w is actual, which I’ll call the desirability of w, and I’ll
write ‘D(w)’.
Causal decision theory says that, when you face a decision, you should make your
choice by considering how desirable things would be, were you to choose eachA ∈ A.
In some decisions, there may be a unique possibility which you think would result,
were you to chooseA. In other decisions, youmay not be sure which possibility would
result, were you to choose A. Think about an act like flipping a coin. Suppose that, in
fact, you don’t flip the coin. Then, if you were to flip it, there would be a 50% chance
that it would land heads and a 50% chance that it would land tails. The principle of
‘conditional excluded middle’ (CEM) nonetheless insists that the coin would either
land heads if it were flipped, or else it would land tails if it were flipped. I accept CEM,
so I think that there is a unique possibility which would have resulted, were the coin
flipped.6 But I don’t think that this possibility is relevant to decision theory, since
3. See, e.g., Horwich (1987) and Albert (2003).
4. More carefully, W contains ways for things to be which you can’t know a priori to be (metaphysically)
impossible. As the subsequent examples should make clear, worlds should be mutually exclusive and jointly
exhaustive, but they need not settle every matter of fact. It is enough for them to settle every relevant matter
of fact.
5. IfW is infinite, then the expectations I write out below should be exchanged for integrals in the usual way.
6. For more on CEM, see Lewis (1973), Stalnaker (1975), and Hájek (ms).
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you don’t know whether the coin would have landed heads or tails, had you flipped it.
(Indeed, inmy view, you can’t know this, since it’s indeterminate whether it would have
landed heads or tails.) So, when you’re thinking about what would have happened,
had you flipped the coin, you’ll have to consider both a world in which the coin lands
heads and a world in which it lands tails. And you’ll have to take them into account in
proportion to your probability that they would result, were you to flip the coin.
So let us introduce a function, wouldA, which tells us which worlds you think
would result, were you to choose A at each possibility. You hand wouldA a world,
w, and it hands you back a probability distribution over ℘(W ), wouldA(w). The inter-
pretation of this probability distribution is thatwouldA(w)(w∗) is how likely you think
it is thatw∗ would result, were you to choseA at the worldw. SinceAwould certainly
result, were you to chooseA, we can stipulate that wouldA(w)(A) = 1. A function like
this is standardly called an imaging function.
I’m going to present CDT in a slightly non-standard way that turns out to be a bit
easier to work with, and which in my opinion makes its commitments about instru-
mental value easier to appreciate. It involves a bit of linear algebra, but just the tiniest
bit. All you need to know in order to check my math is how the multiply matrices
together, and even if you can’t follow the math, I hope you will be able to follow the
philosophical discussion. Fix some enumeration of the worlds inW , w1, w2, . . . , wN .
Then, let ‘C’ be a 1 ×N vector whose ith column is your credence in the world wi .
That is: C = [C(w1),C(w2), . . . ,C(wN )]. Let ‘D’ be an N × 1 vector whose ith row is
the desirability of the world wi , D = [D(w1), D(w2), . . . , D(wN )]′ .7 And let ‘wouldA’
be anN ×N matrix whose entry in the ith row and the jth column iswouldA(wi)(wj ).
Then, CDT says that the choiceworthiness of an act,A, is measured by its utility,U (A),
where:
U (A) def= C ·wouldA · D
(Here, ‘ · ’ is matrix multiplication.) That is: the utility of A consists of three ingredi-
ents: your credences, your desires, and information about what would happen, were
you to choose A.8 Multiply these ingredients together, and you get A’s utility.
CDT says that you should choose an option which maximises utility. As will be-
come clear below, this definition of utility is somewhat under specified. The reason
is that there are a variety of ways of specifying the imaging function wouldA, and dif-
ferent choices lead to different definitions of utility. For instance, Lewis (1981) ef-
fectively understands wouldA(w)(w∗) to be Chw(w∗ | A), where Chw is the objective
chance function at w at the time of choice.9 Others, like Sobel (1994) and Rabinow-
7. V ′ is the transpose of the vector V .
8. In order to count as a version of causal decision theory, the imaging function wouldA must be understood
as providing us with information about what likely would happen, were you to choose A—and not just
information about what likely is the case, if you choose A. For instance, if we set wouldA(w)(w∗) = C(w∗ |
A), then utility reduces to ‘news-value’ and we get back evidential decision theory (introduced below).
9. In fact, Lewis says thatwouldA(w)(w∗) isC(w∗ | AKw), whereKw is the causal dependency hypothesis true
at world w. Kw will entail information about the chance of w∗, given that you choose A, so Lewis (1980)’s
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icz (1982, 2009), will want to understand the imaging function differently.10 In §5
below, I will argue that causalists should understand the imaging function in a way
that none of these authors have understood it. This point is important for understand-
ing my thesis. My thesis is that causal decision theory does not face any new problems
from decisions involving foreknowledge. This doesn’t mean that, e.g., Lewis’s version
of causal decision theory doesn’t face any new problems from these decisions. Indeed,
I think that decisions involving foreknowledge have an important lesson to teach us
about how to understand the imaging function, and that this lessons teaches us that
most extant versions of CDT should be rejected.
Notice that, by the associativity of matrix multiplication, it doesn’t matter whether
we group the imaging functionwouldA with your credences,C, or with your desirabil-
ities,D. A standard presentation of CDT takes the former route, saying that
U (A) = CA · D
where CA
def= C ·wouldA is your credence function imaged on the performance of A.11
One way of thinking about the imaging function wouldA, then, is as an important in-
gredient in a subjunctive analogue to conditioning. While your credences conditioned
onA—which we can write ‘C |A’—tell you how likely each possibility is on the indica-
tive supposition that you’ve performed A, your credences imaged on A, CA, tell you
how likely each possibility is on the subjunctive supposition that you’ve performed A.
Then, CDT tells you to evaluate an act by looking at the expectation of desirability,D,
where the expectation is taken with respect to these ‘subjunctive credences’, CA. This
is to be contrasted with evidential decision theory, EDT, which tells you to evaluate an
act by looking at the expectation of desirability,D, when the expectation is taken with
respect to the your credences conditioned on A, C |A. That is, according to EDT, you
should evaluate act in terms of their news-value, V , where
V (A) def= C |A · D
I think this standard presentation has unfortunately led to some misunderstand-
ings. In particular, it has led some to confuse these ‘subjunctive credences’ with your
actual credences, and to think that, according to CDT, whether you choose A cannot
give you any evidence about whether you were predicted to choose A.12 I think that
CDT’s philosophical commitments are clearer if we group ‘wouldA’ with your desir-
abilities, D. So let us define DA
def= wouldA · D, which gives us the desirability of what
A’s performance would bring about. That is,DA(wi) is the desirability of what choos-
principal principle will imply that C(w∗ | AKw) should be Chw(w∗ | A).
10. See Bales (2016) for a nice overview of the differences between Lewis, Sobel, and Rabinowicz.
11. CDT is presented in terms of imaging your credences onA in Lewis (1981), Sobel (1994), and Joyce (1999).
12. This misunderstanding of CDT is most pronounced in Meek & Glymour (1994).
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ing A would bring about at world wi .13 Then, CDT says that the choiceworthiness of
an act, A, is given by your expectation of this quantity. That is,
U (A) = C · DA
This makes it clearer that, according to CDT, your credences should never be, at any
point in rational deliberation, updated by imaging them on the performance of an act.
Of course, as you deliberate, you may learn that you’re more likely to select the act A.
In that case, you should change your credences by responding this new information
and becoming more confident in A. However, you should do that by conditioning (or
Jeffrey conditioning) on this new information, not by updating your degrees of beliefs
in any other way.
As this formulation makes clear, CDT’s distinctive feature is a certain theory of
instrumental value. According to CDT, the only thing which gives an act instrumental
value is what it would do to bring about desirable ends. A nice illustration of this
commitment is given by no difference:
no difference
Before you are two boxes. You may either take the box on the left, ‘Lefty’,
or the box on the right, ‘Righty’. There is no difference between the boxes.
They both contain exactly the same amount of money. Their contents
were decided yesterday on the basis of a prediction about what you would
freely choose in this decision. If it was predicted that you would freely
choose Lefty, then both boxes contain $100. If, on the other hand, it was
predicted that you would freely choose Righty, then both boxes contain
$10. You take these predictions to be very reliable.
In no difference, EDT says that you have decisive reason to take Lefty. There are
four relevant possibilities to consider: the world where there are one hundred dollars
in the boxes and you take Lefty, wHL, the world where there are a hundred dollars in
the boxes and you take Righty,wHR, the world where there are ten dollars in the boxes
and you take Lefty, wT L, and the world where there are ten dollars in the boxes and
you take Righty, wTR. Because you take these predictions to be so accurate, let’s just
assume that you are certain that you’re either at wHL or you’re at wTR. Then, your
credence in wHL is just your credence that you’ll take Lefty, C(L), and your credence
inwTR is just your credence that you’ll take Righty, C(R). Assuming that your desires
are linear in dollars, the news value of taking Lefty is 100, and the news value of taking
Righty is 10. Learning that you’ve taken Lefty is better news that learning that you’ve
taken Righty. So EDT requires you to take Lefty.
In contrast, CDT says that you have no more reason to take Lefty than you have
reason to take Righty. It says that, when you evaluate your options for choicewor-
13. To be clear: ‘DA(wi )’ is the ith row in the vectorDA. To be slightly more precise,DA(wi ) gives the expected
desirability of what A’s performance would bring about at world wi .
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
wHL wHR wT L wTR
wHL 1 0 0 0
wHR 1 0 0 0
wT L 0 0 1 0




wHL wHR wT L wTR
wHL 0 1 0 0
wHR 0 1 0 0
wT L 0 0 0 1
wTR 0 0 0 1

(b) wouldR
Figure 1: In table 1a, the matrix wouldL(row)(column), which describes what would happen
at each world, were you to select Lefty. In table 1b, the matrix wouldR(row)(column), which
describes what would happen at each world, were you to select Righty.
thiness, you should ask yourself: what would each of the options bring about? You
don’t know for sure, since you don’t know for sure what’s inside the boxes, but you
know that, if there’s $100 in the boxes, then taking either box would get you $100, and
if there’s $10 in the boxes, then taking either box would get you $10. Changing your
choice of box wouldn’t change the boxes’ contents. Formally, wouldL and wouldR are
the matrices shown in figures 1a and 1b, respectively. Those matrices tell us that, had
you taken Lefty at worldwHL orwHR, there’d still be $100 in both boxes, so you would
be at wHL. And had you taken Lefty at world wT L or wTR, there would still be $10 in
both boxes, so you would be at wT L. Likewise, had you taken Righty at world wHL or
wHR, there’d still be $100 in both boxes, so you would be at wHR. And, had you taken
Righty at worldwT L orwTR, there’d still be $10 in both boxes, so you would be atwTR.
This means that choosing L and choosing R would accomplish exactly the same
thing. In any world in which there is $100 in both boxes, both options would get you
$100. And in any world in which there is $10 in both boxes, options would get you $10.
wouldL · D = wouldR · D = [100,100,10,10]′
So the utility of taking Lefty is exactly the same as the utility of taking Righty. They are
both equal to 100 times your credence that you’ll take Lefty plus 10 times your credence
that you’ll take Righty.
U (L) = 100 ·C(L) + 10 ·C(R)
and U (R) = 100 ·C(L) + 10 ·C(R)
So CDT says that you have just as much instrumental reason to take Lefty as you
have instrumental reason to take Righty. Importantly, CDT does not say that you
should be equally glad to find yourself choosing either box. If you learn that you are
taking Lefty, this is fantastic news: it tells you that there is very likely $100 in the boxes.
And if you learn that you are taking Righty, this is terrible news: it tells you that there
is very likely only $10 in the boxes. Learning that you are taking Lefty is reason to be
glad. And learning that you are taking Righty is reason to be sad. If you care about
whether you’re glad or sad before you open your chosen box, then causalists will say
that you have decisive reason to take Lefty. However, if we stipulate that the only thing
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you care about is howmuchmoney you get, then causalists insist you have nomore in-
strumental reason to choose Lefty than you have to choose Righty. You know for sure
that choosing Lefty would get you no more money than choosing Righty would. So,
according to causalists, choosing Righty is not the least bit instrumentally irrational.
Suppose you find yourself waffling back and forth between Lefty and Righty. As
you incline towards Lefty, you give yourself evidence that you will eventually choose
Lefty, so your credence that there’s $100 in the boxes goes up. As you incline towards
Righty, you give yourself evidence that you will eventually choose Righty, so your cre-
dence that there’s $10 in the boxes goes up. In this state of indecisive waffling, your
rational opinions about the money in the boxes will change, depending upon which
choice you’re most inclined to make. This can make it feel like how much money is
in the boxes is under your control—but this is an illusion. Ex hypothesi, you have no
control over how much money is in the boxes. At this point, the only thing you have
control over is your own rational credences. Taking Lefty would raise your rational
credence that there’s $100, and taking Righty would raise your rational credence that
there’s only $10. But you don’t care at all about your rational credence that there’s $100
in front of you. You only care about the $100 being there or not. And since this won’t
change, depending upon which box you select, the causalist says that you’ve no reason
to select either Lefty or Righty over the other. For causalists, the only thing that speaks
in favour of or against a choice is what that choice would bring about.
As a deliberative agent making this decision, you have control over your rational
credence that there’s $100 in the boxes, but you do not have control over whether there
is $100 in the boxes. This can lead to the agential illusion that you have control over
the box’s contents. And this agential illusion of control leads to the illusion that taking
Lefty is more instrumentally valuable than taking Righty. One way of appreciating
that this instrumental value is illusory is by considering the decision from a better
informed, third-personal perspective. For instance, suppose that you are watching
your friend make a choice between Lefty and Righty. You are allowed to look inside of
the boxes, though you’re not allowed to communicate with your friend. Notice that,
no matter what you see, you will see no more instrumental value in your friend taking
Lefty than you see in them taking Righty. So, once you are free of the agential illusion
of control, the inclination to say that there’s more instrumental value in taking Lefty
vanishes.
In fact, from this better-informed, third-personal perspective, a preference for
Lefty over Righty appears irrational. Suppose that your friend is an evidentialist, so
they think that taking Lefty has an instrumental value $90 greater than taking Righty.
Then, your friend would be willing to pay up to $90 in order to take Lefty. Suppose,
then, that your friend faces a different decision, between paying $80 and taking Lefty
or paying nothing and taking Righty. From your perspective, it appears clear that
there is no instrumental value in paying this money. You can see into the boxes, and
you recognise that they both contain the $100. Paying the $80 is just throwing money
away—your friend could easily get $100 by just taking Righty for free. Nonetheless,
if your friend is an evidentialist, then they will throw away $80 in order to take the
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$100 in Lefty, rather than taking the free $100 in Righty. From your better-informed,
third-personal perspective, it is difficult to see this as a rational choice.
There is a general lesson here. It is, without a doubt, intuitive that you should
take Lefty in no difference. But causalists diagnose this intuition as arising from the
illusion that the amount of money in the boxes is under your control, when in fact—ex
hypothesi—the only thing that’s under your control is your own epistemic state. In the
vast majority of cases, if your rational credence that ϕ is under your control, then you
have reason to think that whetherϕmay be under your control. So it’s understandable
that our knee-jerk intuitions would not be sensitive to the distinction between giving
yourself evidence that the world is good and making the world good. However, cases
like no difference show us that giving yourself evidence that the world is good can
come apart from making the world good. The case also teaches us that, when your
rational credence that ϕ is under your control, but you know for sure that whether ϕ
is not, your knee-jerk intuitions about rational action are not to be entirely trusted. You
must be on your guard to clearly distinguish theway theworld is from theway you have
reason to think the world is. And one way of being on your guard is by considering
the question of what instrumental value a choice has from a better-informed, third-
personal point of view.
Lesson #1 When you have control over your rational credence that ϕ, but you know
for sure that you do not have control over whetherϕ, your intuitive judgements
about rational choice can lead you astray by conflating control over your epis-
temic statewith control over the world. In these cases, you should consider what
instrumental value a choice has when viewed from a better informed, third-
personal perspective.
Not everyone is going to learn this lesson fromnodifference. But it is a lessonwhich
should be learnt by any causalist deserving the name. Those who refuse to learn this
lesson think that you should choose to give yourself good news about theway theworld
is, even when this has no effect on the world whatsoever. As Lewis (1981, p. 5) puts it,
they “counsel an irrational policy of managing the news so as to get good news about
matters which you have no control over”.
4 | managing the news from the future
Consider the following decision:
sticker
It is Christmas eve. Under the tree are two gifts from Santa: one for you,
one for your sister. You know for sure that one of them contains this year’s
hottest toy, and the other contains a lump of coal, though you don’t know
which is which. You are absent-mindedly putting stickers on the gifts.
These stickers are purely decorateive; they don’t make any difference with
respect to who gets to open which gift. Before you decide where to place
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Figure 2: The causal structure of sticker.
the reindeer sticker, the oracle informs you: the gift which you will put
the reindeer sticker on contains the toy.
I first learnt about decisions with this structure from Roberts (ms). Roberts argues
that putting the sticker on your own gift is a rational means of getting the toy; and
from this, he concludes that, if you put the sticker on your gift, this causes Santa to
have gifted you the toy in the past. I’m going to take for granted that this conclusion
about the causal structure of the case is incorrect. I’ll suppose that the causal structure
of sticker is as shown in figure 2. In that figure, think of Santa,Outcome,Oracle, and
You as variables which can take on certain values, depending upon what Santa, you,
and the oracle say and do, and depending upon which gift has the sticker and which
gift has the toy. So the variable Santa says whether Santa put the toy in your gift or
your sister’s (we can suppose that Santa has only one toy to give; the other sibling is
getting coal). We can suppose that the oracle will tell you about the contents of the gift
with the sticker on it. So the variable Oracle says whether the Oracle tells you that the
stickered gift has the toy in it, or whether she tells you that the stickered gift has the
coal in it. The variableYou says whether you put the sticker on your gift or your sister’s.
Finally, Outcome says both which gift has the toy and which gift has the sticker.
Santa and You causally determine Outcome. And Outcome causally determines
Oracle—that is, the oracle is likely to tell the truth about Outcome, so whether the gift
with the sticker has the toy in it or not causally determines what the oracle tells you.
It is possible that the oracle’s pronouncement has a causal effect on your choice. For
instance, you might have the following dispositions: if the oracle tells you that the
gift with the sticker has a toy, then you are disposed to place the sticker on your own
gift; and if the oracle tells you that the gift with the sticker has coal in it, then you
are disposed to place the sticker on your sister’s gift. If you have these dispositions,
the oracle’s pronouncement will have a causal effect on your choice, whence the arrow
from Oracle to You in figure 2. (Of course, you might also choose in a way which is
insensitive to the oracle’s pronouncement, whence the arrow is grey, rather than black.)
In this decision, there are four relevant kinds of possibilities. Either Santa gave you
a toy, T , or he gave you a lump of coal, C. And either you will put the sticker on your
gift, Y , or you will put it on your sister’s gift, S . Let ‘wT Y ’ be a world in which Santa
gave you a toy and you put the sticker on your own gift. Let ‘wT S ’ be a world in which
Santa gave you a toy and you put the sticker on your sister’s gift. And likewise for ‘wCY ’
and ‘wCS ’.
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
wT Y wT S wCY wCS
wT Y 1 0 0 0
wT S 1 0 0 0
wCY 0 0 1 0




wT Y wT S wCY wCS
wT Y 0 1 0 0
wT S 0 1 0 0
wCY 0 0 0 1
wCS 0 0 0 1

(b) wouldS
Figure 3: In figure 3a, the matrix wouldY (row)(column), which describes what would hap-
pen at each world, were you to affix the sticker to your gift. In figure 3b, the matrix
wouldS (row)(column), which describes what would happen at each world, were you to affix the
sticker to your sister’s gift.
There are interesting questions to be raised about what would happen in sticker,
were you to choose differently. For instance, in the world wT Y , you put the sticker on
your gift. At this world, what would have happened, were you to put the sticker on
your sister’s gift instead? There’s a temptation to answer: were you to put the sticker
on your sister’s gift, the oracle would still have told you that the gift with the sticker has
the toy. And since the oracle is making every effort to speak truly, this means that it
would have to be the case that the gift with the sticker did contain the toy. Since your
sister’s gift would be the one with the sticker on it, this means that Santa must have
given the toy to your sister, and given the coal to you. Therefore, at the world wT Y ,
had you put the sticker on your sister’s gift, you’d have been in a world at which Santa
gave you coal: wCS . This can seen like a natural way of reasoning, in part because
ordinarily, when we think about what would happen, were we to choose differently,
we hold fixed our causal past—and, in this case, the oracle’s prognostication lies in
your causal past. But we plainly cannot hold fixed all of your causal past, since, in this
case, your choice also lies in your causal past. In contrast, we could figure out what
would have happened, had you chosen differently, by considering a scenario in which
your choice does not depend upon its causal past, and then thinking through how the
rest of the world might change, were you to choose differently.14 I’m going to take it
for granted here that this second way of thinking about what would happen, were you
to choose differently, is the one which is relevant to rational choice. So, at the world
wT Y , were you to put the sticker on your sister’s gift, this decision would not have been
influenced by the oracle’s pronouncement. Since your sister’s gift contains the coal at
wT Y , this would be a world at which the gift with the sticker contains the coal—and
therefore, it would very likely be a world at which the oracle tells you that the gift with
the sticker has the coal.
More generally, I’ll suppose that wouldY and wouldS are as shown in figure 3. And
I’ll suppose that you only care about who gets the toy and who gets the coal—you
don’t intrinsically desire the sticker being on your gift or your sister’s gift. With these
assumptions in place, CDT treats sticker just like no difference. Putting the sticker
14. In the lingo: we could consider a possibility in which you choose differently as the result of an intervention.
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on your gift gives you evidence that you’ll get the toy, and putting the sticker on your
sister’s gift gives you evidence that you’ll get the coal, but the sticker does nothing at
all to change what Santa has gifted you. No matter what gift you have, putting the
sticker on your gift and putting it on your sister’s gift would bring about exactly the
same results. That is, wouldY · D = wouldS · D =D.
Hitchcock (2016) thinks that CDT gives the wrong verdict about sticker. He
thinks that, when you have information about the consequences of your choices, this
information needs to be taken into account in a different way than other kinds of in-
formation. And so he endorses a variant of CDT for decisions with foreknowledge.
To understand Hitchcock’s variation of CDT, it helps to first consider how orthodox
CDT tells you to take foreknowledge into account. Let’s use ‘C0’ for your ur-prior cre-
dence function—the credence function you are disposed to hold in the absence of any
evidence. The norm of ur-prior conditionalisation says that your credences at any time
should be C0 conditioned on your total evidence at that time.15 So, suppose that your
total evidence consists of the ordinary evidence E and the foreknowledge F. Then,
whenever you’re making a choice, your credences will be C0 | EF, where ‘EF’ is the
conjunction of E and F. Then, CDT advises you to evaluate acts for choiceworthiness
with the expectation
U (A) = (C0 |EF) ·wouldA · D
Hitchcock thinks that this is a mistake. According to him, foreknowledge of the
consequences of your choices should not be incorporated into decision-making in the
same was as ordinary evidence. Instead, he advises you to evaluate acts for choicewor-
thiness with:
H(A) = ((C0 |E) ·wouldA) |F · D
That is: you should first take into account your ordinary evidence by conditioning
C0 on E, next image your probability function on the performance of A, and only
then take into account your foreknowledge by conditioning the probability function
(C0 |E) ·wouldA on F. You should then take an expectation of desirability using the
resulting probability function, ((C0 |E) ·wouldA) |F.16
In sticker, if you most want the toy for yourself and you don’t care about the
placement of the sticker, then Hitchcock’s theory will tell you it is rationally oblig-
atory to put the sticker on your gift. For concreteness, suppose that, in the absence
of any evidence, you think Santa was equally likely to gift the toy to you as he was to
gift it to your sister, that you’re equally likely to put the sticker on either gift, and that
15. I am focusing on conditionalisation for the sake of simplicity, but similar points could be made about the
generalisations of conditionalisation proposed by Jeffrey (1965), Schoenfield (2017), or Gallow (forth-
comingb).
16. Hitchcock (2016) uses causal Bayes nets rather than imaging to determine this probability function, but
this won’t make any difference to my discussion here. You can determine a joint probability distribution
over the variables Santa, You, Outcome, and Oracle using the causal Markov condition in the natural way,
and, when it comes to the possibilities described by wT Y ,wT S ,wCY , and wCS , the probability function
which results from intervening on You in the Bayes net is exactly the same as the probability function which
results from imaging on your action.
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these choices are independent. Then, C0 = [C0(wT Y ), C0(wT S ), C0(wCY ), C0(wCS )]
= [1/4,1/4,1/4,1/4]. And your only evidence is the foreknowledge that you put the
sticker on the gift with the toy—that is, F = {wT Y ,wCS }. Let’s take D = [D(wT Y ),
D(wT S ),D(wCY ),D(wCS )]′ to be [100,100,0,0]′ .17 Then,
H(Y ) = (C0 ·wouldY ) | F · D
= 100
and H(S) = (C0 ·wouldS ) | F · D
= 0
So Hitchcock says that it is irrational to place the sticker on your sister’s gift—even
though the sticker itself does not affect the contents of you or your sister’s gifts.
Evidentialists should be pleased with this verdict, but if we are causalists, and we’ve
taken Lesson #1 to heart, then I think we should side with orthodox CDT over Hitch-
cock’s proposed amendment. There is, to be sure, an intuition in this case that you
should decide where to put the sticker by considering who you’d rather get the toy.
But this is, ex hypothesi, a case in which you have no control over who gets the toy.
What you do have control over is your rational credence that you got the toy. For, by
putting the sticker on your own gift, you give yourself very strong evidence that Santa
has decided to give you the toy. And, by putting the sticker on your sister’s gift, you
give yourself very strong evidence that Santa has decided to give your sister the toy.
But the sticker is just a sticker. It doesn’t change what’s on the inside of the packages.
Lesson #1warns us to be on guard: our intuitive judgements about rational choice can
lead us astray in precisely these kinds of cases. While evidentialists should be comfort-
able advising you to manage the oracle’s news from the future—giving yourself news
that the world is good, even what your choice does absolutely nothing to change the
world for the better—causalists should not.
Causalists should also notice that the strong intuition that placing the sticker on
your gift has instrumental value vanishes with additional information. Suppose that
it is not you making this decision, but instead your sister. While your sister cannot
look into the gifts, you can (though you cannot communicate with her). You see that
you have been gifted the toy and your sister has been gifted the coal. From this per-
spective, it does not appear that there is any instrumental value in placing the sticker
on her package. Moreover, from this better-informed, third-personal point of view, a
preference for placing the sticker on either gift can appear irrational. For illustration,
suppose that your sister wants you to have the toy (she’s just a better person than you
are—Santa really should have given the toy to her), and suppose that she subscribes to
Hitchcock’s decision theory. Then, she will think that placing the sticker on your gift
has an instrumental value equal to the value of you getting the toy. Suppose that you
17. I’ve arbitrarily chosen to make 100 the desirability of getting the toy and 0 the desirability of getting the
coal. Since desirability is measured on an interval scale, any other pair of numbers where the first is higher
than the second would be an equivalent representation of your desirabilities.
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getting the toy is worth $100 to your sister, and that she is only allowed to place the
sticker on your gift if she pays $90. From your perspective, it appears clear that there
is no instrumental value in paying the $90 to place the sticker on your gift. You can
look into the gifts and see that you have the toy and your sister has the coal. Paying to
put the sticker on your gift is just throwing $90 away for no reason. You’d still have the
toy if your sister didn’t pay the $90. Nonetheless, Hitchcock advises your sister to
throw away $90 on a decorative sticker which does nothing to affect whether you get
the toy or not. From your better-informed, third-personal point-of-view, it is difficult
to see this as a rational choice.
So it seems tome that causalists should say precisely the same thing about sticker
that they say about no difference: you’ve no reason to choose either of the options
over the other, since neither of the options would make any difference to anything you
care about. So causalists have no reason to worry about orthodox CDT’s verdicts in
cases like sticker. On the contrary, they should worry about any decision theory,
like Hitchcock’s, which counsels an irrational policy of managing the news from
the future so as to get good news about matters over which you have absolutely no
control. They should worry about ceding to an agential illusion of control in sticker
after having fought against it in cases like no difference. In both sticker and no
difference, one option gives evidence that your desires are satisfied without doing
anything to satisfy those desires, and another option gives evidence that your desires
are frustrated without doing anything to frustrate those desires. So I have a hard time
seeing why a causalist should treat these decisions differently.18 I agree that there’s a
strong intuition that it’s irrational to put the sticker on your sister’s gift. But I also think
that there’s a strong intuition that it’s irrational to take Righty in no difference. Why
should we dismiss the verdicts of intuition when an agential illusion of control is due
to reliable prediction, but not when it is due to reliable prescience?
5 | foreknowledge and chance
Some believe that foreknowledge makes a difference to the chances. For illustration:
suppose we are about to perform a quantum coin flip which has an objective, tychistic
50% chance of landing heads and an objective, tychistic 50% chance of landing tails.19
Before the coin is flipped, the oracle informs you that the coin will land tails. Hearing
all this, it’s natural to say: you should think that the chance that the coin lands heads
is 50%, but your credence that the coin lands heads should be less than 50%. Hall,
Meacham, and Spencer object to this description of the case. They say: if the oracle
is actually able to foresee the outcome of the coin flip, then the fact that she sincerely
18. As I’m using the term, Hitchcock is not a causalist. Rather, he is an evidentialist who accepts a libertarian
metaphysics according to which free choices are the consequence of an uncaused Will. For this reason,
Hitchcock will not want to draw Lesson #1 from no difference.
19. More realistically: we’re going to use a Stern-Gerlach apparatus to measure the x-spin of an electron in the
quantum state
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§5 foreknowledge and chance
prophesies that the coin will land tails must raise the objective chance that the coin
will land tails.20
Hall and Meacham take this position in order to argue that a principle of chance
deference need not include an ‘admissibility’ clause, telling you to only defer to the
objective chances when you lack foreknowledge. Spencer is additionally interested in
defending orthodox CDT from some putative counterexamples involving foreknowl-
edge. For instance, consider:21
foreknown loss
A fair coin will be flipped. Before it is flipped, you are offered a ticket
which pays out $150 if the coin lands on heads, and only costs $50. Before
you decide whether to buy the ticket, the oracle informs you that the coin
will land on tails.
In this decision, Hall, Meacham, and Spencer say that, insofar as you think that
the oracle’s prophesy is known, you should think that the objective chance of tails is
greater than 50%. I disagree. In my view, the objective chance of tails is still 50%, but
you should be more confident in tails than heads. Spencer (2020) thinks that, if we
say this, CDT will say that you are rationally required to buy the ticket, in spite of your
foreknowledge that the ticket is a loser.
Does CDT say that? That depends upon what would happen, were you to buy the
ticket. There are four relevant possibilities. The coin either lands heads,H , or tails, T .
And you either buy the ticket, B, or you do not, N . Let wHB be a possibility at which
the coin lands heads and you buy the ticket. LetwHN be a possibility at which the coin
lands heads and you do not buy the ticket, and likewise forwT B andwTN . Then, let us
suppose that, were you to buy, the coin would be just as likely to land heads as tails, and
were you to not buy, the coinwould be just as likely to land heads as tails. Then,wouldB
and wouldN are as shown in figure 4. We can assume that your desirabilities are linear
with dollars, so that D = [D(wHB),D(wHN ),D(wT B),D(wTN )]′ = [100,0,−50,0]′ .
With these assumptions, CDT says that the instrumental value of buying the ticket is
constant—it is worth $25, no matter which world you’re at:
wouldB · D = [25,25,25,25]′
Whereas not buying the ticket has a constant instrumental value of $0:
wouldN · D = [0,0,0,0]′
20. Hall (1994) and Meacham (2010) only consider the case where the fact that the oracle prophesiesϕ entails
thatϕ. Spencer (2020) considers the more general case in which the oracle’s prophesy thatϕ simply makes
it more likely that ϕ.
21. Decisions like these are discussed by Price (2012), who uses them to argue for a subjectivism about cau-
sation, according to which you have causal control over past events which are correlated with your choice.
(For instance, Price (2012) agrees with Roberts (ms) that, by putting the sticker on your gift, you cause




wHB wHN wT B wTN
wHB 1/2 0 1/2 0
wHN 1/2 0 1/2 0
wT B 1/2 0 1/2 0




wHB wHN wT B wTN
wHB 0 1/2 0 1/2
wHN 0 1/2 0 1/2
wT B 0 1/2 0 1/2
wTN 0 1/2 0 1/2

(b) wouldN
Figure 4: In figure 4a, the matrix wouldB(row)(column), which describes what would be likely
happen at eachworld, were you to buy the ticket. In figure 4b, thematrixwouldN (row)(column),
which describes what would likely happen at each world, were you to not buy the ticket.
So it won’t matter what your credences are, or what foreknowledge you possess. CDT
will say that taking the bet is required, and refusing it is impermissible, nomatter what
the oracle has told you.
I agree with Spencer that this is terrible advice. Given your foreknowledge, you
know that the ticket is a loser, this knowledge is not in any way contingent upon
whether you buy the ticket or not, and buying the ticket doesn’t make any difference
to whether the coin lands heads or tails. So you should not buy the ticket. Spencer
lays the blame on my assumption that, in foreknown loss, the objective chance of
the coin landing heads is 50%. In my view, the oracle’s prophesy has not altered the
chances, so I think that there is a problem here. But the problem is not a problem for
CDT. It is instead a problem for our theories of subjunctive supposition. I follow Ra-
binowicz (1982, 2009) in laying the blame on the assumption, encoded inwouldB and
wouldN , that the coin would be just as likely to land heads as tails, were you to take the
bet.
Recall, I defined wouldB(w)(w∗) as how likely it is that w∗ would result, were you
to choose B at the world w. In my treatment of foreknown loss above, I implic-
itly assumed that, for each option A and each pair of worlds w,w∗, we should set
wouldA(w)(w∗) to the objective chance of w∗, at world w, conditional on you choos-
ing A. That is, I implicitly assumed that wouldA(w)(w∗) = Chw(w∗ | A). Sobel and
Rabinowicz notice that, in decisions like foreknown loss, this leads to a violation
of Strong Centering.
Strong Centering If w is a world at which you choose A, then were you to choose A
at w, w is the world which would result.
if A is true at w, then wouldA(w)(w) = 100%
The analogue of Strong Centering is a consequence of Lewis’s 1973 semantics for
counterfactuals. On that semantics, if A is true at w, then so too is A → w.22 In
the context of Lewis’s semantics for the subjunctive conditional, this imposes the re-
22. I’m using ‘w’ for the proposition {w}, which is true at the world w and false at all other worlds.
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
wHB wHN wT B wTN
wHB 1 0 0 0
wHN 1/2 0 1/2 0
wT B 0 0 1 0




wHB wHN wT B wTN
wHB 0 1/2 0 1/2
wHN 0 1 0 0
wT B 0 1/2 0 1/2
wTN 0 0 0 1

(b) wouldN
Figure 5: If we impose Strong Centering on the matrices wouldB and wouldN from figures 4a
and 4b, and make no other changes, we get the matrices above.
quirement that A∧C entails A → C.23 If we accept Lewis’s semantics, and we are
thinking of wouldA(w) as telling us how likely it is that each world would result, were
you to performA at worldw, then it is natural to expect thatwouldA will satisfy Strong
Centering. Nonetheless, Lewis (1986) rejects Strong Centering in his formulation of
causal decision theory. His motivation for this rejection is not clear to me, and not ex-
plicitly explained to the reader.24 In any case, whatever Lewis’s reasons for disagreeing
may have been, I agree with Rabinowicz that there is good reason to endorse Strong
Centering.
However, Strong Centering on its own will not afford us a satisfactory treatment
of foreknown loss. To see why, notice that, if we impose Strong Centering on the
imaging functionswouldB andwouldN from figure 4 andmake no other changes, then
we will get the imaging functions which are shown in figure 5. With these assumptions
about wouldB and wouldN , the desirability of what N would bring about will remain
unchanged (it’s still certain to bring you $0, no matter what). But the desirability of
what B would bring about at each world is now different. At the worlds where you
don’t take the bet, taking the bet would still bring you $25 in expectation, but at the
worlds where you do take the bet, taking it would win you $100, if the coin lands heads,
and lose you $50, if the coin lands tails. That is:
wouldB · D = [DB(wHB),DB(wHN ),DB(wT B),DB(wTN )]′ = [100,25,−50,25]′
You foreknow that you are either at the world wT B or the world wHB. So, if C(B) is
23. For a compelling defence of this principle, known as ‘conjunction conditionalisation’, see Walters &
Williams (2013).
24. He does explain to the reader that, were he to accept Strong Centering, he could not accept his formulation
of CDT in terms of ‘dependency hypotheses’. For Rabinowicz (1982) proved that, so long as Lewis allows
that wouldA(w) does not always assign all of its probability to a single world, were he to additionally accept
StrongCenering, Lewis’s dependency hypotheseswould not always be compatiblewith your choosing every
available option. And Lewis’s formulation of CDT relies upon this always being the case. If there were
some antecedent reason to favour Lewis’s formulation of CDT over an alternative formulation like Sobel’s
which takes the imaging function wouldA as primitive, then this would give us a reason to reject Strong
Centering. However, if there is a reason like that, then Lewis (1981) does not provide it. In fact, he spends




your credence that you will take the bet, then the utility of taking the bet will be
U (B) = −50 ·C(B) + 25 · (1−C(B))
= 25− 75 ·C(B)
IfC(B) > 1/3, then the utility of taking the bet will be less than the utility of not taking
the bet. So, if you find yourself inclining towards taking the bet (and therefore, you
give yourself evidence that you will likely take the bet), then CDT will advise you to
not take the bet. However, if you listen to this advice, and learn that you have, then
your credence that you will take the bet, C(B), will fall below 1/3. And at that point,
the utility of taking the bet will exceed the utility of not taking the bet, and CDT will
advise you to take it.
So, if we simply impose StrongCentering, then foreknown loss turns into a case
in which CDT’s recommendations are sensitive to your own predictions about what
you will choose. I think that cases like these pose a problem for CDT (I’ll have more to
say about them in §6 below). But usually, when CDT exhibits this kind of predictive
sensitivity, there is something deeply correct about its advice. What’s correct in the
advice is that, from the perspective you’ll occupy when choosing either of the options,
you should expect that taking the other option would make things better. That’s how
things usually go in cases where CDT’s advice is prediction-sensitive in this way. But
that doesn’t seem to be the case in foreknown loss. In this decision, when you refuse
the bet, you know that the coin will land tails, so you know that taking the bet would
lose you money. So, when rejecting the bet, you shouldn’t expect that taking the bet
would make anything better.
Inmy view, the problem posed by foreknown loss is a decision-theoretic variant
of the problem posed by the so-called ‘Morgenbesser conditional’, attributed to Sidney
Morgenbesser by Slote (1978, fn 33). Morgenbesser imagines a situation in which I
offer you a bet on whether a flipped coin will land heads, and you decline my offer. I
then flip the coin, and it lands heads. At that point,
(MC) If you had taken the bet, you would have won.
appears true, even though, at the time when you had to choose whether to take the
bet or not, there was only a 50% chance that the coin would land heads. In my view,
conditionals like (MC) show us that, when we make a subjunctive supposition that A,
we hold fixed things which are causally independent of whetherA, even if those things
would have been a matter of chance at the time when A would have happened. Even
though it was a matter of chance whether the coin would land heads or tails when you
had to make your choice, we hold fixed how the coin landed when we suppose that
you had taken the bet. And the reason is that whether you take the bet or not has no
effect on how the coin lands.
So I think that, in addition to Strong Centering, we should accept the following
principle:
Causal Independence If whether ϕ is causally independent of your choice, then ϕ
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
wHB wHN wT B wTN
wHB 1 0 0 0
wHN 1 0 0 0
wT B 0 0 1 0




wHB wHN wT B wTN
wHB 0 1 0 0
wHN 0 1 0 0
wT B 0 0 0 1
wTN 0 0 0 1

(b) wouldN
Figure 6: If we imposeCausal Independence on thematriceswouldB andwouldN fromfigures
4a and 4b, we get the matrices above.
would not change its truth-value, were you to choose any of your options. That
is, if whether ϕ is causally independent of your choice, then for any option A,
wouldA(w)(ϕ) =
 1 if ϕ is true at w0 if ϕ is false at w
In the case of foreknown loss, whether you buy the ticket is causally independent
of whether the coin lands heads or tails, so Causal Independence tells us that the way
the coin lands wouldn’t change, were you to buy the ticket. That is, it tells us that the
matrices wouldB and wouldN are as shown in figure 6.
With these assumptions about what would happen, were you to buy or not buy the
ticket, CDT will advise you against buying the ticket, no matter how confident you are
that youwill buy it. Again, not buying the ticket,N, would bring you $0 at every world.
But nowwe will say what is intuitively true: buying the ticket, B, would bring you $100
at the worlds where the coin lands heads, and would lose you $50 at worlds where the
coin lands tails. That is:
wouldB · D = [DB(wHB),DB(wHN ),DB(wT B),DB(wTN )]′ = [100,100,−50,−50]′
If you lack foreknowledge, then you’ll think that the coin is just as likely to land heads
as tails, the utility of buying the ticket will be an expected $25, and CDT will advise
you to buy the ticket. If, however, you have foreknowledge that the coin will land tails,
then the utility of buying the ticket will be a certain loss of $50, and CDT will correctly
tell you to not buy.
In sum: decisions like foreknown loss pose a prima facie problem for CDT. But
we need not respond to this problem by insisting that the oracle’s prophesy makes a
difference to the objective chances, as Spencer does. We could instead see the prob-
lem as an instance of a well-known problem with our theories of subjunctive supposi-
tion. Then, the lesson of foreknown loss will be the same as the lesson of the Mor-
genbesser conditional. They both teach us to distinguish the probability that ϕ would
result, were you to choose A, from the chance of ϕ, conditional on your choosing A.
Lesson #2 Theprobability thatϕwould result, were you to chooseA, is not always just
the chance ofϕ, conditional on your choosingA. If you chooseA andϕ is true,
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then ϕ would be true, were you to choose A. And, if ϕ is causally independent
of your choice, then ϕ would not change its truth-value, were you to choose
differently.
6 | foreknowledge and prediction sensitivity
As we briefly saw in §5 above, CDT’s advice is sometimes sensitive to your predictions
about your own choices. That is: the choices which CDT says are rational can depend
upon which choice you think you will make. In my view, this is a problem with CDT.
I will not attempt to persuade you to accept this consequence of CDT. I will try to
persuade you that it is not a problem which is unique to decisions made with fore-
knowledge. And I will try to persuade you that there is something deeply right about
CDT’s advice in these cases, whether they involve foreknowledge or not.
A classic case of prediction sensitivity comes from Gibbard & Harper (1978):
death in damascus
You must choose whether to go to Aleppo or Damascus. And you know
that Death has an appointment with you in one of these cities. Death
does not watch over you, so your decision about where to go does not
affect where Death awaits. But Death has made a prediction about which
city you will choose, and he awaits in the predicted city. You take Death’s
predictions to be incredibly reliable.
In this decision, there are four relevant possibilities. Either Death awaits in Aleppo,
α, or Death awaits in Damascus, δ. And either you go to Aleppo, A, or you go to
Damascus, D . Let wαA be a possibility at which Death awaits in Aleppo and you go
to Aleppo. Let wαD be a possibility at which Death awaits in Aleppo and you go to
Damascus. And likewise for wδA and wδD . Then, we can suppose that you prefer
avoiding Death to meeting Death, and otherwise, you do not care which city you visit,
so thatD = [D(wαA),D(wαD ),D(wδA),D(wδD )]′ = [0,1,1,0]′ .25
By stipulation, whether you go to Aleppo or Damascus makes no difference with
respect to where Death awaits. So, if Death is in Aleppo, then if you were to go to
Damascus, Death would still be in Aleppo. And, if Death is in Damascus, then if you
were to go to Aleppo, then Death would still be in Damascus. More generally, wouldA
and wouldD are as shown in figure 7. Then, the instrumental value of going to Aleppo
will depend uponwhether Death awaits in Aleppo orDamascus. If Death is in Aleppo,
then going toAleppowould bring about your death. Whereas, if Death is inDamascus,
then going to Aleppo would save your life.
wouldA · D = [DA(wαA),DA(wαD ),DA(wδA),DA(wδD )]′ = [0,0,1,1]′
25. I’ve arbitrarily chosen to make 1 the desirability of living and 0 the desirability of dying. Since desirability is
measured on an interval scale, any other pair of numbers where the first is higher than the second would be
an equivalent representation of your desirabilities. But the choice of 1 and 0 makes the math a bit simpler.
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
wαA wαD wδA wδD
wαA 1 0 0 0
wαD 1 0 0 0
wδA 0 0 1 0




wαA wαD wδA wδD
wαA 0 1 0 0
wαD 0 1 0 0
wδA 0 0 0 1
wδD 0 0 0 1

(b) wouldD
Figure 7: In figure 7a, the matrix wouldA(row)(column), which describes what would happen
at each world, were you to go to Aleppo. In figure 7b, the matrix wouldD (row)(column), which
describes what would happen at each world, were you to go to Damascus.
Likewise, the instrumental value of going to Damascus will depend upon where Death
awaits. If Death is in Aleppo, then going to Damascus would save your life. Whereas,
if Death is in Damascus, then going to Damascus would bring about your death.
wouldD · D = [DD (wαA),DD (wαD ),DD (wδA),DD (wδD )]′ = [1,1,0,0]′
Death’s predictions are very reliable, so we might as well suppose that they are
perfect (it will simplify the math without making any substantive difference to our
treatment of the case). So you are certain that you are either atwαA orwδD . Therefore,
your credence that you are at wαA is just your credence that you’ll go to Aleppo, and
your credence that you are at wδD is just your credence that you’ll go to Damascus.
Therefore, the utilities of going to Aleppo and Damascus are
U (A) = C(D)
and U (D) = C(A)
As your credence that you will go to Aleppo rises, so too does the utility of going to
Damascus. And as your credence that you will go to Damascus rises, so too does the
utility of going to Aleppo. If you are less than 50% confident that you’ll go to Aleppo,
then CDT says that going to Aleppo is rationally required. On the other hand, if you
are more than 50% confident that you’ll go to Aleppo, then CDT says that going to
Aleppo is impermissible, and that you should instead go to Damascus.
In this case, CDT’s prediction-sensitivity means that, if you both incline towards
following its advice and learn that you are so inclined, then CDT will reverse that ad-
vice. Suppose you initially thought that you were going to go to Damascus. Then,
CDT tells you that you must go to Aleppo. If you listen to CDT and learn that you’re
listening to it, then you’ll get evidence that you’ll likely go to Damascus. At that point,
your rational credence that you’ll go to Aleppo, C(A), will fall below 50%, and CDT
will reverse course and tell you to go to Aleppo. If you listen to it again, then it will
change its mind again. In this decision, there is no option which CDT will continue to
endorse after you’ve learnt that you intend to choose it. That is, whichever option you
actually choose, CDT will say that this choice was irrational, and that you were ratio-
nally required to choose the other. Just to have a name for this kind of phenomenon,
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we can say that, in death in damascus, CDT forbids your prediction.
By forbidding your prediction, CDT violates the following schematic principle: if
A is a rational option, then, if you choose A, you will choose a rational option. For
suppose that you’re confident that you’ll choose Aleppo. Then, CDT says that going to
Damascus is a rational option. But if you then choose Damascus, you’ll give yourself
evidence that Death awaits in Damascus, and going to Damascus will no longer be a
rational option.
For another, importantly different, case of prediction-sensitivity, consider cake in
damascus.
cake in damascus
You must choose whether to go to Aleppo or Damascus. And you know
that your fairy godmother has left cake for you in one of these cities. Your
fairy godmother does not watch over you, so your decision about where
to go does not affect where the cake awaits. But she has made a prediction
about which city you will choose, and she left the cake in the predicted
city. Your fairy godmother’s predictions are incredibly reliable.
CDT’s advice in cake in damascus again depends upon how likely you are to go
to Aleppo or Damascus. The decision is structurally exactly the same as death in
damascus, except that, in this decision, youwant your choice tomatch the prediction.
If we now use ‘α’ and ‘δ’ for your fairy godmother leaving you cake in Aleppo and
Damascus, respectively, then wouldA and wouldD are still as they are shown in figure
7. If we then suppose that D = [D(wαA),D(wαD ),D(wδA),D(wδD )]′ = [1,0,0,1]′ ,
while C is still [C(A),0,0,C(D)], then
U (A) = C(A)
and U (D) = C(D)
So, as your credence that you will go to Aleppo rises, so too does the utility of going
to Aleppo. And as your credence that you will go to Damascus rises, so too does the
utility of going to Damascus. According to CDT, whichever city you think you’re most
likely to go to is the city that you’re rationally required to go to. Suppose that you start
out thinking that you’re just as likely to go to Aleppo as you are to go to Damascus.
Then, CDT will tell you that both of your options are rational. However, if you start to
incline towards going to Aleppo, and you learn that you have, then CDTwill reverse its
verdict, telling you that, in fact, going to Damascus, which it previously called rational,
is in fact an irrational choice. In this decision, there is no option which CDT will
continue to endorse after you’ve learnt that you don’t intend to choose it. That is, CDT
will say that you are rationally forbidden from choosing whichever option you don’t
actually choose. Just to have a name for this kind of phenomenon, say that, in cake
in damascus, CDT demands your prediction.
By demanding your prediction, CDT violates the following schematic principle: if
A is an irrational option, then, if you choose A, you will choose an irrational option.
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For suppose that you’re confident that you’ll choose Aleppo. ThenCDT says that going
to Damascus is an irrational option. If you then choose to go to Damascus, you’ll give
yourself evidence that cake awaits in Damascus, and going to Damascus will no longer
be an irrational option.26
I think that both of these kinds of prediction-sensitivity are a problem. Inmy view,
rational permission is not the kind of thing which is retracted simply because the per-
mission is exercised. Likewise, rational prohibition is not the kind of thing which is re-
tracted simply because the prohibition is violated. Elsewhere, I’ve suggested a revision
of CDT which deals with cases like this in a prediction-insensitive way.27 Nonetheless,
I think that there is something deeply right about the way that CDT treats these cases.
What’s deeply right about CDT’s treatment of cake in damascus is that, no matter
which city you end up selecting, you should believe that your choice of destination has
more instrumental value than the alternative. After all, if you find yourself going to
Aleppo (e.g.), then you should think that your choice is taking you to the cake, and
that the alternative would lead you away from cake. And surely a choice which leads
you towards your desired ends has more instrumental value than a choice which leads
you away from those desired ends. Likewise, what is deeply right about CDT’s treat-
ment of death in damascus is that, no matter which city you find yourself travelling
towards, you should believe that the alternative has more instrumental value than your
choice. After all, if you find yourself going to Aleppo (e.g.), then you should think that
your choice is killing you, and that the alternative would save your life. Surely a choice
which saves your life has more instrumental value than a choice which kills you!
In my view, then, decisions like these teach us three lessons. Firstly, it can be ratio-
nal to choose an option even when you’re very confident that it has less instrumental
value than an alternative. To put the point more pithily: it can be rational to choose
what you know to be the worst. Secondly, it can be irrational to choose an option, even
when you are very confident that it has more instrumental value than an alternative.
With more pith: it can be irrational to choose what you know to be the best. These are
lessons which I draw from these cases, but I won’t insist upon them here.
However, there is a third lesson which these cases teach us, and which I do want
to insist upon. This is the dual of Lesson #1. Lesson #1 taught us that, if whether
ϕ is not under your control, but your rational credence that ϕ is under your control,
then you may be subject to an agential illusion of control, and your intuitions about
rational choice may be led astray. In decisions like death in damascus and cake in
26. Deliberational causal decision theorists like Skyrms (1990), Arntzenius (2008), and Joyce (2012, 2018)
tell you to pursue actions in proportion to their utility until your predictions about what you will do are in
an equilibrium. An equilibrium is a deliberational perspective from which every live option (every option
you give positive credence to selecting) has an equal utility. Once you’re in an equilibrium, Joyce advises
you to select between the live options in a way which is not sensitive to differences in utility. Insofar as
deliberational CDT does not say anything about the rationality of choice outside of equilibrium, it will not
forbid your prediction. However, it will sometimes demand your prediction; it will therefore violate this
schematic principle along with orthodox CDT.




damascus, the reverse is true: your rational credence that you’ll get cake or death,
respectively, is not under your control. No matter what you predict about what you’ll
do, you will be certain that cake or death awaits. However, whether you get cake or
death is under your control. Suppose that you actually go to Aleppo and are greeted
with cake or death. Then, it was in your control to go to Damascus. And, had you
gone to Damascus, you wouldn’t have found cake or death. In these kinds of decisions,
causalists should recognise that a lack of control over your rational credence thatϕ can
lead to the agential illusion that you have no control over whetherϕ. And in cases like
these, too, we should be wary of our knee-jerk intuitions about rational choice.
Again, this agential illusion can vanish when you think about things from a better-
informed, third-personal perspective. To illustrate, we can imagine that your friend,
rather than you, is making the decision about whether to go to Aleppo or Damascus.
And we can imagine that, while your friend does not know where Death is, you do.
As you watch your friend deliberate about where to go, it will appear that there is
much more instrumental value in the destination which takes them away from Death.
From this point-of-view, there’s no inclination towards the fatalistic verdict “just pick
whichever city—it doesn’t matter”.
Lesson #3 When you have no control over your rational credence that ϕ, but you
know for sure that you do have control over whether ϕ, your intuitive judge-
ments about instrumental value can lead you astray by conflating a lack of con-
trol over your epistemic statewith a lack of control over the world. In these cases,
you should consider what instrumental value a choice has when viewed from a
better-informed, third-personal perspective.
With this lesson appreciated, consider
choosing the chances
There are two coins in front of you: a black one and a white one. You
must choose which coin to flip. The black coin has a 2/3rds bias towards
heads, and the white coin has a 2/3rds bias towards tails. If you flip the
black coin, then you are betting on the outcome of the flip. If the black
coin lands heads, then you will get $90; whereas, if the black coin lands
tails, you will lose $90. Before you make your choice, the oracle informs
you that the coin you flip will land on tails.
You will either flip the black coin, B, or the white one, W , and the flip will either
land heads, H , or tails, T . So there are four relevant possibilities, wHB,wHW ,wT B,
and wTW , with the natural interpretation. Having learnt Lesson #2, I’m going to take
Strong Centering for granted,28 so I’m going to suppose that the imaging functions
wouldB and wouldW are as shown in figure 8. I’ll suppose that your desires are linear
in dollars, so that D = [D(wHB), D(wHW ), D(wT B), D(wTW )]′ = [90,0,−90,0]′ .
28. As the reader may verify for themselves, if we don’t impose Strong Centering, then CDT will require you to
flip the black coin, and this requirement won’t be prediction-sensitive.
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
wHB wHW wT B wTW
wHB 1 0 0 0
wHW 2/3 0 1/3 0
wT B 0 0 1 0




wHB wHW wT B wTW
wHB 0 1/3 0 2/3
wHW 0 1 0 0
wT B 0 1/3 0 2/3
wTW 0 0 0 1

(b) wouldW
Figure 8: In figure 8a, the matrix wouldB(row)(column), which describes what would happen
at each world, were you to flip the black coin. In figure 8b, the matrix wouldW (row)(column),
which describes what would happen at each world, were you to flip the white coin.
Then, the instrumental value of flipping the black coin at a will be $90, if you actually
flip black and it lands heads, -$90 if you actually flip black and it lands tails, and $30 if
you actually flip white. On the other hand, the instrumental value of flipping white is
a constant $0.
wouldB · D = [90,30,−90,30]′
and wouldW · D = [0,0,0,0]′
Your foreknowledge tells you that the coin lands tails, so your credence that you’re at
world wT B is just your credence that you flip the black coin. And your credence that
you’re at wTW is just your credence that you flip the white coin. Therefore, the utility
of flipping black is $30 minus $120 times your credence that you’ll take black.
U (B) = 30− 120 ·C(B)
And the utility of flipping white is just a guaranteed $0, U (W ) = 0.
This means that, if your credence that you’ll choose black is anywhere above 25%,
then black will have a lower utility than white. That is: so long as you’re more than
1/4th sure that you’ll flip the black coin, you’ll think that black has lower instrumental
value than white, and CDTwill advise you to flip white. However, if your credence that
you will flip black drops below 25%, then the utility of flipping black will rise above
the utility of flipping white, and CDT will change its mind, advising you to flip black
instead. So, in choosing the chances, CDT’s advice is prediction-sensitive, and it
forbids your prediction.
There is a persistent inclination to be fatalistic about this decision and insist: Of
course you shouldn’t take the bet—the coin’s going to land tails no matter what you do!
If we’ve learnt Lesson #3, we must guard ourselves against this inclination. For, even
though this is a decision in which you know that the coin will land tails, it is not a deci-
sion in which you know that the coin will land tails nomatter what you do. While your
rational credence that the coin lands tails is not under your control, whether the coin
lands tails is under your control. Lesson #3 teaches us that our knee-jerk judgements
of instrumental value can be led astray in precisely these kinds of decisions. So let
us consider the matter from a better informed, third-personal perspective, imagining
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that it is your friend making this decision, and not you. There are two better informed
perspectives to consider, depending upon whether your friend flips the white or the
black coin.
Suppose first that they flip the black coin. Then, the oracle’s prophesywas about the
black coin, so the black coin lands tails, and your friend’s choice cost them $90. Losing
$90 is a bad outcome. There’s more instrumental value in a guaranteed $0 than there
is in a $90 loss. So, in the possibility, your friend has chosen the option with the least
instrumental value. Suppose, on the other hand, that your friend flips the white coin.
Then, the oracle’s prophesy was about the white coin, and not the black. That is, the
reason why the oracle told your friend that the coin landed tails is that the white coin
lands tails—the coin which is, after all, biased towards tails. So, if your friend flips the
white coin, then the oracle’s prophesy told them nothing at all about how the black coin
would have landed, were they to flip it. And, were they to have flipped black instead,
they would have had a 2/3rds chance of getting $90, and a 1/3rd chance of losing $90.
On average, flipping the black coin with these odds would get them $30. That’s a good
bet. So your friend has turned down a good bet with an instrumental value of $30 in
exchange for a guaranteed $0. So, in this possibility too, your friend has chosen the
option with the least instrumental value.
These are not the only possibilities, of course. The oracle could be wrong. How-
ever, these are the only two possibilities that your friend is taking seriously in their
deliberation. And in both of them, their choice has a lower instrumental value than
the alternative; that is, in both of them, they choose the worst option. CDT is abso-
lutely correct about this, whether or not it’s correct to forbid your prediction.
In other decisions with foreknowledge, CDT will demand your prediction. Con-
sider:29
pauper’s problem
You are a pauper. Tomorrow, the lords will send you into battle. You do
not have any armour, but you could spend your life’s savings to purchase
some. The chance of surviving battle without armour is 10%. The chance
of surviving with armour is 90%. Before you decide whether to purchase
the armour, the oracle informs you that you will survive.
In this decision, either you will survive, S , or you will die, D . And either you will buy
the armour,B, or youwillnot,N . So there are four relevant possibilities: wSB,wSN ,wDB,
and wDN , with the natural interpretation. I’ll suppose that your desire to survive is
ten times stronger than your desire to not lose your life savings, so that the desirability
of losing your life, but not your life savings, can be represented with 10, the desir-
29. This decision (or a close variant of it) is discussed in Lewis (1986), Rabinowicz (2009), Price (2012), and
Stern (forthcoming). Bales (2016) argues that the case does not pose a problem for CDT by showing that
different specifications of the imaging functions can secure whatever verdict you like. However, the two
versions of CDT which yield the decisive ‘buy the armour’ and the decisive ‘don’t buy the armour’ verdicts
have both failed to learn Lesson #2 from §5, so they will say that you should buy the ticket in foreknown
loss. Any version of CDT which has learnt Lesson #2 will demand your prediction in pauper’s problem.
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
wSB wSN wDB wDN
wSB 1 0 0 0
wSN 9/10 0 1/10 0
wDB 0 0 1 0




wSB wSN wDB wDN
wSB 0 1/10 0 9/10
wSN 0 1 0 0
wDB 0 1/10 0 9/10
wDN 0 0 0 1

(b) wouldN
Figure 9: In figure 9a, thematrixwouldB(row)(column), which describes what would happen at
each world, were you to buy the armour. In figure 9b, the matrix wouldN (row)(column), which
describes what would happen at each world, were you to not buy the armour.
ability of losing your life savings but nor your life can be represented with 100, and
likewise, D = [D(wSB), D(wSN ), D(wDB), D(wDN )]′ = [100,110,0,10]′ . Because I
have learnt Lesson #2, I will assume thatwouldB andwouldN both satisfy Strong Cen-
tering, and therefore are as shown in figure 9. Finally, because the oracle has informed
you that you will survive, your credence that you are in wSB is just your credence that
you’ll buy the armour, and your credence that you are in wSN is just your credence
that you will not. It then follows that
U (B) = 90+10 ·C(B)
and U (N ) = 110− 90 ·C(B)
If your credence that you will buy the armour is greater than 1/5th, then the utility of
buying will exceed the utility of refraining. And, if your credence that you will buy the
armour is less than 1/5th, then the utility of not buying will exceed the utility of buying.
So, in this case, CDT demands your prediction.
I won’t defend demanding your prediction. On my view, you are both permitted
and required to buy the armour, no matter how likely you think you are to buy it. But I
nonetheless think that we should accept everythingCDThas to say about instrumental
value in pauper’s problem. In this decision, too, there is an inclination to be fatalis-
tic: You shouldn’t buy the armour—you’re going to survive no matter whether you buy it
or not! Again, Lesson #3 warns us to resist this fatalistic impulse. While you have no
control over your rational credence that you survive, you do have control overwhether
you survive. Let us consider the matter from a better informed, third-personal per-
spective, and imagine that it is your friend making this decision, and not you. Again,
there are two better informed perspectives to consider, depending upon whether your
friend ends up buying the armour or not.
Suppose first that they refrain frombuying the armour. Then, so long as the oracle’s
prophesy is accurate, they do survive, even without the armour, and their choice has
kept them from losing their life savings. In this possibility, purchasing the armour
would have accomplished nothing other than leaving them penniless and exposing
them to a 10% risk of losing their life. Sparing your life savings is more instrumentally
valuable than wasting it on armour that you don’t need, and which exposes you to a
10% chance of death. So, in this possibility, your friend has chosen the option with
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the most instrumental value. On the other hand, suppose that your friend buys the
armour. In this possibility, they survive (per the oracle’s prophesy), and moreover, the
decision to purchase the armour very likely saved their life. Had they not purchased
the armour, they would have exposed themselves to a 90% chance of death. Since they
value their life 10 times more than their life savings, keeping their life savings is not
worth a 90% chance of death. So, in this possibility, too, your friend has chosen the
option with the most instrumental value.
These are not the only possibilities. The oracle’s prophesy could be false. But these
are the only possibilities which your friend takes seriously in their deliberation. And
in both of them, they choose the option with the highest instrumental value. CDT is
right about this, whether or not it’s right to demand your prediction.
7 | foreknown irrationality
Distinguish two kinds of decision under foreknowledge. You could have foreknowl-
edge which does not, even conjoined with your other background information, tell
you anything non-trivial about what you will in fact choose. Call decisions like this
exotic. Alternatively, you could have foreknowledge which, conjoined with your other
background information, tells you something non-trivial about what you will in fact
choose. Call decisions like this wild.
For an example of a wild decision: you may either choose a guaranteed $1 or a
guaranteed $100. Before you decide, the oracle tells you that you will actually take the
$100. What should you do? Clearly, you should take the $100. Taking the $100 was the
rational choice before receiving the foreknowledge, the foreknowledge doesn’t appear
to change your values or your views aboutwhatwould result from each possible choice,
so taking the $100 should still be the rational choice afterwards.
For another wild decision: suppose again that you may choose either a guaranteed
$1 or a guaranteed $100. Before you decide, the oracle tells you that you will actually
take the $1. Then, what should you do? Again, you should take the $100. If the oracle
speaks the truth, then you won’t; but it’s not clear why the oracle’s prophesy should
change what it is rational for you to do. In general, it’s possible for you to choose irra-
tionally while knowing that you are doing so. Inmundane cases of akrasia, you choose
irrationally while knowing that you are doing so. Why should knowingly choosing
irrationally be more problematic, just because the knowledge of your irrationality is
foreknowledge?
In cases of akrasia, even if you know that you will choose irrationally, you wouldn’t
retain that knowledge, were you to choose differently. Because your owndeliberation is
the source of your knowledge that you will choose irrationally, the knowledge depends
upon that very deliberation. Were you to deliberate differently, you would lose your
knowledge that you are choosing irrationality. And the same is true in wild decisions.
In fact, you take the $1, and you knew that youwere going to, on the basis of the oracle’s
testimony. However, were you to have chosen the $100, youwould not have known that
youwere going to take the $1. Either the oracle wouldn’t have prophesied that youwere
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going to take the $1, or else this prophesy would not have been known.
Importantly, in wild decisions, what is known and what is merely believed may
depend upon your choice. Suppose that you actually take the $1. Then, you are in a
‘good case’—at least, the case is epistemically good. The oracle speaks from knowledge
of your choice, and you form the belief that you will take the $1 on the basis of her
known testimony. In these circumstances, you may come to know that you’ll take the
$1. If you had taken the $100, then either the oracle wouldn’t have prophesied that
you’d take the $1 (so that, at the moment of choice, you misremember her prophesy)
or else she would have falsely prophesied that you’d take the $1. Either way, you would
be in a ‘bad case’—at least, the case would be epistemically bad. You would not be in
a position to know that you take the $1 (because you don’t). So, even though you are
actually in a good case, and you know that you will take the $1, had you taken the $100,
you would have been in a bad case, and you would not have known this.30
In actuality, you both take the $1 and know that you will take the $1. I say that
you chose irrationally. What should you have done? Well, to start, you should have
opened deliberation about what to do. At that point, you should have begun to take
seriously the possibility that you take the $100, which is a possibility in which you
don’t know that you’ll take the $1, and in which the oracle’s prognostication is false or
misremembered. Since $100 is better than $1, you should have inclined towards taking
the $100. These inclinations give you evidence that you actually will take the $100, so
through the course of deliberation, you should have become more confident that you
will take the $100. And thatmeans becoming less confident that the oracle speaks from
knowledge, and so becoming less confident that you know that you are going to take
the $1. You should have then taken the $100, and been confident that either the oracle
prophesied falsely or that you misremembered her prophesy. This is my advice, and I
give it to you in both the ‘good case’ and in the ‘bad cases’. In the ‘bad cases’, you follow
my advice and the oracle’s prophesy is not known. In the ‘good case’, you don’t follow
my advice, and you know that you won’t follow it.
There’s a general lesson to be learnt here:
Lesson #4 In decisions made with foreknowledge, your own rational deliberation can
provide you with evidence that the oracle’s prophesy is false, misleading, or
misremembered. So you shouldn’t always take your foreknowledge for granted
when deliberating about what to do.
In the previous decisions we’ve considered, your deliberation about what to do did
not furnish you with evidence that the oracle’s prophesy was false, misleading, or mis-
remembered. So, in those decisions, there was no harm in taking the prophesy for
granted throughout deliberation. However, in wild decisions, we must exercise more
caution.
Stern (forthcoming) considers the following decision:




Smoking causes lung cancer by causing your lungs to blacken. The effects
of smoking on lung cancer are entirely mediated by its effects on whether
your lungs blacken. You would enjoy smoking, but you would hate to
contract lung cancer. Before you decide whether to smoke, the oracle tells
you about the results of a future medical test: your lungs will blacken.
To fill out the decision, we may suppose that you’re very confident that nothing be-
sides smoking causes lungs to blacken, so that you are very confident that you smoke,
conditional on your lungs blackening. Then, the oracle’s prophesy has provided you
with foreknowledge which, conjoined with your other background information, tells
you something non-trivial about what you will in fact choose: it tells you that you are
quite likely to choose to smoke. So this decision is wild.
Inmy view, futuremedical test is not importantly different from the decision in
which the oracle tells you that you will choose the $1 over the $100. If she speaks from
knowledge, then you will smoke, blacken your lungs, and thereby, quite likely, give
yourself lung cancer. This is an irrational choice. If you do this, then you’ve chosen to
expose yourself to a significant chance of death. The fact that this irrational choice was
foretold does nothing to alter that fact. Stern disagrees. He writes: “it seems clear (at
least to this author) that you should go ahead and smoke. After all, you already know
that your lungs will blacken no matter what you do. Why not savor the pleasures of
the cigarette?” If we’ve appreciated Lesson #3, then we should be cautious about this
kind of fatalistic reasoning. If you follow Stern’s advice and smoke, then you do know
that your lungs will blacken. But you emphatically do not know that your lungs will
blacken no matter what you do. Let us consider the matter from a better informed,
third-personal perspective. Suppose that your friend is deciding whether to smoke.
The oracle tells them that their lungs will blacken, they decide to smoke, their lungs
blacken, and they die of lung cancer. From your point of view, it appears clear that
your friend’s choice killed them. Had they not smoked, they would have lived. Your
friend had control over whether or not to die of lung cancer, and they chose to die. It
seems clear (at least to this author) that a choice which kills you has less instrumental
value than a choice would would have saved your life.
Stern assumes that your knowledge that your lungs blacken is not under your con-
trol: whether you choose to smoke or not, you will still know that your lungs blacken,
on the basis of the oracle’s prophesy. However, I think that Lesson #4 should lead
us to question the assumption. Given that there are no other likely causes of black
lung, learning that you have refrained from smoking gives you evidence that the or-
acle’s prophesy is false, misleading, or misremembered. So it seems to me that you
shouldn’t take the oracle’s prophesy for granted in your deliberation about whether to
smoke.
Stern considers another version of this decision, in which there is another po-
tential cause of black lung: a rare genetic condition which causes black lung, whether
or not you smoke. In that version of the decision, given that you find yourself not
smoking, you should think it most likely that you have the genetic condition, and that
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smoking wouldn’t do any harm. On the other hand, given that you find yourself smok-
ing, you should think it’s most likely that you don’t have the genetic condition, and
your choice to smoke is likely killing you. This decision is one in which CDT forbids
your prediction. In my opinion, it’s not importantly different from choosing the
chances. We should heed Lesson #3 and guard against the fatalistic reasoning which
conflates a lack of control over your rational credence that your lungs blacken with a
lack of control over whether your lungs blacken.
Stern disagrees, and proposes a modification of CDT which will advise you to
smoke in this decision.31 To appreciate Stern’s proposal, let’s use ‘C0’ for your ur-
prior credence function, and suppose that your total evidence consists of the ordinary
evidence E and the foreknowledge F. Then, as we saw in §4, CDT evaluates acts for
choiceworthiness with
U (A) = (C0 | EF) ·wouldA · D
That is: CDT tells you to take all of your evidence into account by updating your ur-
prior credences on it, and then use the resulting probability function, C0 | EF, to take
an expectation of how desirable things would be, were you to chooseA. Stern thinks
that, instead, you should evaluate acts for choiceworthiness with
S(A) = (C0 | E) ·wouldAF · D
That is: Stern tells you to take your ordinary evidence into account by updating your
ur-prior credences on it. Then, you should use the resulting probability function, C0 |
E, to take an expectation of how desirable things would be, were you to choose A
while your foreknowledge is held fixed. For instance, when you think about what would
happen, were you to not smoke, Stern tells you to hold fixed that your lungs blacken.
This theory rejects Lesson #4, since it requires you to take your foreknowledge
for granted when deliberating about what to do. Consider again the wild decision in
which you are given a choice between a guaranteed $1 and a guaranteed $100, and the
oracle informs you that you will take the $100. In this decision, I think it is clear that
it is irrational to take the $1. But Stern has a hard time agreeing. The reason is that,
even though the S-value of taking the $100 is well-defined, it’s unclear how we should
define the S-value of taking the $1. Ex hypothesi, you have only two available options:
taking the $1 and leaving the $100 behind—call that option ‘O’, for one—and taking
the $100 and leaving the $1 behind—call that option ‘H ’, for hundred. Choosing both
O and H is impossible. If you leave the $100 behind, then you cannot take it, too. In
this decision, you have foreknowledge that you take the hundred, H . So the S-value
of taking the $1 is:
S(O) = C0 ·wouldOH · D
31. As I’m using the term, Stern is not a causalist. He is instead, like Hitchcock (2016), an evidential decision
theorist who accepts a libertarian metaphysics according to which free choices are the consequence of an
uncaused Will. See footnote 18.
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The issue is that it’s unclear how we should think about wouldOH . That is, it’s unclear
how we should think about what would happen, were you to—per impossibile—take
only the $1 and take only the $100. And if we can’t assign an S-value to taking the $1,
then we won’t be able to say that it’s rational to take the $100, nor that it’s irrational to
take the $1.
One suggestion which looks natural in Stern’s favoured formalism is that you
should make nested counterfactual suppositions. For instance, perhaps you should
first imagine a possibility which is just like the actual world, except that your fore-
knowledge does not depend upon its causal past, and then imagine a possibility which
is just like that world, except that you choose A in a way which doesn’t depend upon
your causal past.32
What this theory tells us depends upon how widely we construe ‘foreknowledge’.
One thing you know for sure is that youwill be $100 richer in tenminutes iff you choose
the $100. So, when the oracle provides you with the foreknowledge that you will take
the $100, you are in a position to know that you’ll be $100 richer in ten minutes. If this
information counts as foreknowledge which is to be held fixed, then the S-value of
taking the $1 will equal the S-value of taking the $100. For, in calculating the S-value
of taking the $1, we should first counterfactually suppose that you take the $100 and
that you’re $100 richer in ten minutes—and that neither of these facts depends upon
their causal past. And then, we should further counterfactually suppose that you take
the $1. This second supposition undoes some, but not all, of the first one. We’re left
with a possibility in which you take the $1, but still end up $100 richer in ten minutes.
And this is just as desirable as a possibility in which you take the $100 and end up $100
richer in ten minutes. So, if we construe ‘foreknowledge’ broadly, then Stern’s theory
will tell you that it’s rationally permissible to take a guaranteed $1 over a guaranteed
$100. This looks like a bad permission to give, and the badness of the permission is
not mitigated by the fact that you don’t act on it.
We could try to construe ‘foreknowledge’ more narrowly, so that your foreknowl-
edge only includes the information which the oracle explicitly provides, and not the
information which you can readily deduce from her prophesy. Then, the theory would
say—correctly, I think—that it is irrational to take the $1. For if foreknowledge is nar-
row, we should calculate the S-value of taking the $1 by first counterfactually suppos-
ing that you take the $100, and then counterfactually supposing that you take the $1.
The second supposition undoes the first, and we say that the S-value of taking the $1 is
$1. Similarly, we should calculate the S-value of taking the $100 by first counterfactu-
ally supposing that you take the $100 and next supposing that you take the $100. The
second supposition adds nothing to the first, and we say that the S-value of taking the
$100 is $100.
But consider the following variant of our wild decision: you are given a choice
32. Stern’s favoured formalism utilises causal Bayes nets. In that formalism, the suggestion is that we first




between $1 and $100. Before you make your choice, the oracle tells you that, in ten
minutes, you’ll be $100 richer. Now, to calculate the S-value of taking the $1, we first
counterfactually suppose that you are $100 richer in ten minutes (and that this fact
does not depend upon its causal past) and then counterfactually suppose that you take
the $1. This second supposition does not undo the first, so we say that, in this variant
of the decision, the S-value of taking $1 is the same as the S-value of taking $100. So,
again, the theory will give you permission to take the $1.
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